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TAXATION-COLLECTION AND ENFORCEMENT-ACTION AGAINST COLLECTOR
OF lliTERNAL REVENUE NOT THE PROPER METHOD OF REMOVING FEDERAL TAX

LmNs-Plaintiff's property was under a federal tax lien. He brought suit in the
district court against the Collector of Internal Revenue, alleging fraudulent issuance of the lien and seeking removal and damages occasioned by the cloud on his
title. The collector moved to dismiss on the grounds that no claim was stated upon
which relief could be granted, and further, that the collector was not the proper
party defendant, while the United States, which had not been joined, was indispensable to the proceeding.1 Held, petition dismissed. The court found no indication of fraud, but even assuming fraud to exist, the collector cannot be
sued for damages traceable to acts within his authority. Effective administration
demands that he be free from apprehension of suits. Moreover, the liens are the
property of the government rather than the collector, so the United States must
be joined. Sidbury v. Gill, (D.C. N.C. 1952) 102 F. Supp. 483.
Since the court found the lien in the principal case to have been properly
imposed, it cannot be said that the result reached was erroneous. However, the
case raises the question of how a plaintiff with a genuine grievance would proceed to obtain removal of a federal tax lien.2 What are the possible courses of
action? Suit against the collector for damages caused by the wrongfully imposed
lien exists as a possibility, but the plaintiff will find that the courts grant a large
measure of immunity to the official in such cases. An unpaid assessment is the
collector's protection, even if he acts from bad motives. 8 'Within the scope of
his authority'' is so broadly defined that only in the most extreme cases would
the collector be reqU:ired to answer in damages.4 Indeed, the language of the
principal case suggests that public prosecution is the only remedy against a collector who acts wrongfully.5 Equitable remedies are also strictly limited. A
statute provides that "... no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment
or collection of any tax shall be maintained.•.."6 While the courts have indicated that they may be willing to ignore its provisions in certain cases,7 attempts
The collector also made objections to venue, in which he was sustained.
The necessity of. removal becomes apparent when it is seen that the maximum
damages obtainable for wrongful foreclosure by the United States is likely to be limited by
the amount obtained at the sale. Kjar v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 406 (1947).
s E.g., Powell v. Rothensies, (D.C. Pa. 1949) 86 F. Supp. 701. In Moore Ice Cream
Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 53 S.Ct. 620 (1933), the collector who had acted within his
authority was held entitled to a certificate changing the suit to one against the United
States.
4 Powell v. Rothensies, supra note 3.
5 Principal case at 485.
6 26 U.S.C. (1946) §3653. There are exceptions made in favor of the right, granted
in connection with each of the principal taxes levied by the federal government, to petition
the Tax Court for a redetermination of the liability. I.R.C., §272(a), §87l(a), §l012(a).
If the taxpayer acts within 90 days, he can prevent distraint proceedings with an injunction
until a redetermination is complete. As regards the typ!l of case in question, however, the
time limits are likely to have elapsed before imposition of the lien.
7 24 VA. L. REv. 176 (1938). The statute is regarded as declaratory of equitable
principles, and can thus be abandoned when plaintiff shows no adequate legal remedy and
unusual hardship.
1
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to enjoin the collector to remove a tax lien have not met with success, for several reasons: (1) The courts have held that the act of the collector in giving
notice of lien is purely ministerial.8 Thus, the lien is the property of the United
States, and the collector has no power to discharge it. 9 (2) Since the lien is the
property of the United States, it is an indispensable party defendant.10 However,
the United States enjoys sovereign immunity, and so cannot be sued without
its consent.11 To what extent this immunity has been waived we shall examine
later. (3) The plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law in the classic method of
attack upon any tax levy, payment under protest and request for refund,12 and
in the statutory methods provided for removal and release of lien.18 (4) Even if
all these objections were met, the courts would limit injunctive relief to the
cases of greatest hardship.14 Similarly, mandamus has been held not available.15
Tax controversies are specifically denied the use of declaratory judgments.16
One decision17 suggested that a plenary suit to collect the property (a bank
account) in which the collector was joined would serve to discharge a lien improperly issued, but in light of the generally accepted objections enumerated
above, it would appear that this course has little to recommend it outside the
court of its origin. It seems clear, therefore, that the plaintiff's remedy, if any,
lies in a suit against the United States under the proper statute. Until 1931, the
only statute which permitted removal of a lien was section 3679 of the Internal
Revenue Code.18 By its provisions, one claiming a lien or other interest prior
to that of the United States (or one who had purchased at a sale to satisfy such
lien or interest), could bring a suit to foreclose, but on real property only. This
act, which continues in force, offers little remedy to the lien debtor. The courts
look upon it only as authorizing an action to determine priority of liens, that is,
to clear title for prior claimants rather than to extinguish liens for tax debtors. 19
Also, the assessment of the tax upon which the lien is based is conclusively presumed valid,20 which makes the action of little value to the lien debtor who may
wish to show the lien invalid because the assessment was improper. Under the
Act of 1931,21 either a junior or senior lienor could ask for foreclosure, but

s Erskine v. Hohnbach, 81 U.S. 613 (1871).
9 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Charleston Lead Works, (D.C. S.C. 1928) 24 F. (2d)
836; Czieslik v. Burnet, (D.C. N.Y. 1932) 57 F. (2d) 715.
10 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Charleston Lead Works, supra note 9; Stafford Mills v.
White, (D.C. Mass. 1930) 41 F. (2d) 58.
11 Czieslik v. Burnet, supra note 9.
12 Ibid.
13 Naus v. Brodrick, (D.C. Kan. 1951) 103 F. Supp. 233.
14 Stafford Mills v. White, supra note 10; 24 VA. L. REv. 176 at 178 (1938).
15 Katsh v. Rafferty, (D.C. N.Y. 1926) 12 F. (2d) 450; Czieslik v. Burnet, supra
note 9.
10 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §2201.
17Westheimer v. Collector of Internal Revenue, (D.C. N.Y. 1935) 12 F. Supp. 20.
18 Originally R.S. §3207, now 26 U.S.C. (1946) §3679.
19 United States v. Henry, 26 A.F.T.R. l 181 (1939); Czieslik v. Burnet, supra note 9.
2026 U.S.C. (1946) §3679(c).
2146 Stat. L. 1528 (1931).
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again only on real property. In 1942, this law was changed to include personal
property also, and to allow an action to clear title.22 While this change was probably designed only to better the remedies of lienors, apparently it also afforded
an opportunity for the lien debtor to test the validity of the federal tax lien on
his property. A recent case has named this statute as the adequate legal remedy
preventing equitable relief.23 No other statute exists for the removal of liens. 24
If the amended 1931 act is generally adopted as the remedy of the lien debtor,
an effective solution to the problem will have been found. However, future cases
may reveal certain obstacles. Long association of these statutes with lienors'
remedies has brought from the courts the statement that they have no power
to extinguish the lien, but merely the power to remove the cloud from the property concerned in the case.25 We may hope that if this statute becomes the
recognized remedy of the lien debtor to test validity, rather than simple priority,
of liens, this view will be abandoned. We may also find some courts insisting
that the p:i;oper course lies not under this statute, but in payment of the assessment and request for refund.26 Since there are cases of one person's property
being impressed with a lien to satisfy another's tax debt,27 payment would seem
an undue hardship. While there is much to be said for preventing the interruption of tax collection to try the validity of its imposition, it would seem that
some clear and summary method of testing the regularity of a tax lien should be
available by statute to the property owner.
John Houck, S. Eel.
22 56 Stat. L. 1026 (1942). The present version is 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §2410.
23 Naus v. Brodrick, supra note 13.
24 I.R.C., §§3673-3674 provide for release of lien by the Commissioner where there

has been payment or the tax debt has become unenforceable, or because an acceptable bond
has been posted. Also, partial discharge of lien may be obtained by payment or by having
other property of twice the value of the lien. None of these provisions allows the validity
of the lien to be brought into question.
25 United States v. Henry, supra note 19; Czieslik v. Burnet, supra note 9.
26 So in Czieslik v. Burnet, supra note 9.
27Westheimer v. Collector, supra note 17.

